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HELLER, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, AND
RECONSTRUCTION: PROTECTING ALL
FREEDMEN OR ONLY MILITIAMEN?
Stephen P. Halbrook*
In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia began his
analysis of the perceived meaning of the Second Amendment
during Reconstruction by writing that "[i]n the aftermath of
the Civil War, there was an outpouring of discussion of the
Second Amendment in Congress and in public discourse, as
people debated whether and how to secure constitutional
rights for newly free slaves."' This was part of a broader
historical narrative that began with the right's English
origins and concluded with late-nineteenth century legal
scholarship as a means of expositing the common
understanding of "the right of the people to keep and bear
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a revised version of a paper presented to the American Society for Legal History
Annual Meeting, Nov. 13, 2009. Copyright © 2010 Stephen P. Halbrook. All
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1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2809-10 (2008) (citing
generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
& THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (Greenwood Publishing Group 1998)
[hereinafter HALBROOK, FREEDMEN] reprinted as STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS: FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (Independent Institute 2010). Other works by this author
on the subject include: Stephen P. Halbrook, The Freedmen's Bureau Act & the
Conundrum Over Whether the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Second
Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 683 (2002); Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal
Security, Personal Liberty, and 'the Constitutional Right to Bear Arms'. Visions
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341
(1995); S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., THE RIGHT To KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION 68 (2d Sess.
1982).
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arms" as an individual liberty which could be exercised for
self defense, hunting, and other lawful purposes.2 Because it
was espoused seventy-five years after the Second
Amendment's ratification, the Court did not believe the
Reconstruction prospective provided as much of an insight as
the earlier sources, but it was nonetheless instructive in
illustrating the common understanding of the Amendment in
an era when the Southern States sought to disarm African-
Americans.3
The discussion of Reconstruction, however, bears special
significance given the consequences of the Court's holding
that the Second Amendment protects the individual right to
keep and bear arms not only for militia use, but also for self-
defense, hunting, and other lawful purposes. This opens the
door to the issue of whether the Second Amendment is
incorporated into the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to
make it applicable to the States and localities.4  That
question is now pending before the Supreme Court, and, as
this article explains, the Reconstruction-era understanding
suggests that the Second Amendment is applicable to the
States.I
I. THE HELLER MAJORITY: DISARMING OF AFRICAN-
AMERICANS UNDER THE BLACK CODES
The Heller Court's analysis begins with an
acknowledgment that "[bilacks were routinely disarmed by
Southern States after the Civil War."6 While the opinion does
not explain in detail how this was done in the period just
after the war, it is useful to note two ways in which the
2. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2805-12.
3. See id. at 2810.
4. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted sub nom. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
6. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2810.
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disarming took place. First, the Southern States enacted
statutes prohibiting African-Americans from possessing
firearms. For instance, a Mississippi law provided that: "[N]o
freedman, free negro or mulatto, not in the military service of
the United States government, and not licensed so to do by
the board of police of his or her county, shall keep or carry
fire-arms of any kind.... ."' Second, these laws were enforced
not only by local sheriffs, but also by the state militias. This
led to the introduction of civil rights legislation in Congress.
Bill sponsor Senator Henry Wilson explained in part: "In
Mississippi rebel State forces, men who were in the rebel
armies, are traversing the State, visiting the freedmen,
disarming them, perpetrating murders and outrages on
them. ... "'
Concerning disarming, the Heller Court notes that:
"Those who opposed these injustices frequently stated that
they infringed blacks' constitutional right to keep and bear
arms. Needless to say, the claim was not that blacks were
being prohibited from carrying arms in an organized state
militia."9 This showed historical continuity in the common
understanding that the Second Amendment protects
individual rights rather than State powers to maintain a
militia or a "right" to be conscripted to bear arms in the
militia. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion disputes this
point.'0
The Heller Court gave examples-all but one of them
from the critical year of 1866-of when Congress enacted civil
rights legislation and proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to
the States." A Freedmen's Bureau report stated that
Kentucky law prohibited African-Americans from possessing
arms: "Their arms are taken from them by the civil
authorities .... Thus, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms as provided in the Constitution is infringed."2 A report
by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction stated that in
South Carolina "armed parties are, without proper authority,
7. 1865 Miss. Laws 165.
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1865).
9. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2810.
10. See infra Parts V and VI.
11. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2810-11.
12. Id. at 2810 (quoting H.R. ExEC. DOC. No. 39-70, at 233, 236 (1st Sess.
1866).
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engaged in seizing all fire-arms found in the hands of the
freemen [sic]," and that this violated "their personal rights"
guaranteed by the Second Amendment.'3  The report
continued that the freedmen were peaceful and could be
trusted with firearms, which they needed for subsistence
hunting and crop protection.' 4 The Heller Court made note of
the fact that these views were widely held. For instance, The
Loyal Georgian newspaper assured African-Americans that
"[aill men, without distinction of color, have the right to keep
and bear arms to defend their homes, families or
themselves."'5
II. THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU ACT
The right to bear arms was most explicitly recognized by
Congress in the Freedmen's Bureau Act, section 14 of which
provided in part:
[Tihe right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal
security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition
of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional
right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all
the citizens . . . without respect to race or color, or
previous condition of slavery .... 16
Heller was the first Supreme Court opinion to acknowledge
those words, which had not been referenced in any judicial
opinion until 2000, when Justice Janice Rodgers Brown of the
Supreme Court of California did so to illustrate the
correlation between self-defense, citizenship, and freedom
during Reconstruction. 17
Congressional debate concerning the Freedmen's Bureau
Act reflected the understanding that freed blacks had a
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. An
opponent even acknowledged that the founding generation
"were for every man bearing his arms about him and keeping
13. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 39-30, pt. 2, at 229 (1st Sess. 1866) (Proposed
Circular of Brigadier General R. Saxton)).
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting HALBROOI, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 19).
16. Id. (quoting Freedmen's Bureau Act, 14 Stat. 176-177 (1866)).
17. Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 601-02 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., concurring)
(citing Stephen P. Halbrook, Second Class Citizenship & the Second Amendment
in the District of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTs. L.J. 105, 141-150
(1995)).
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them in his house, his castle, for his own defense."1 8
While not further discussed in Heller, the Freedmen's
Bureau Act represents one of the most important aspects of
the incorporation debate. First, the Act was a veto override
passed by more than two-thirds of the same Congress that
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 Such an enactment
is obviously more indicative of Congressional intent than, say,
a floor statement by a member of Congress. Second, the
Freedmen's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
companion enactments that sought to protect the same rights
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to guarantee. 20 As
explained by Representative George W. Julian, the
constitutional amendment was needed to uphold the Civil
Rights Act, which:
[I]s pronounced void by the jurists and courts of the South.
Florida makes it a misdemeanor for colored men to carry
weapons without a license to do so from a probate judge,
and the punishment of the offense is whipping and the
pillory.... Cunning legislative devices are being invented
in most of the States to restore slavery in fact.21
Third, the .,meaning of "personal liberty, personal
security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of
estate, real and personal," as "including the constitutional
right to bear arms," are basic concepts of the Anglo-American
legal tradition. Blackstone explained that certain "auxiliary"
rights were necessary to "maintain inviolate the three great
and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property."22 Together with justice in the courts and
the right of petition, these included "the right of having and
using arms for self-preservation and defense."23 The framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment used similar terminology, 24
18. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2810 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
362, 371 (1866) (Sen. Davis)).
19. See HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 41-42. See also CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3842, 3850 (1866).
20. "[Section] 14 of the amendatory Freedmen's Bureau Act... re-enacted,
in virtually identical terms for the unreconstructed Southern States, the rights
granted in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866." Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780,
797 n.26 (1966).
21. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3210 (1866).
22. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMNENTARIES *141.
23. Id. at *144.
24. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (Rep. James Wilson,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee).
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and the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects from state infringement upon the
"indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property."25
While the Heller Court did not delve into this much
detail, this rationale is of great significance in the
incorporation issue. The Court did refer to floor speeches on
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Samuel
Pomeroy described "'indispensable' 'safeguards of liberty...
under the Constitution' as including a man's "right to bear
arms for the defense of himself and family and his
homestead."2 6 According to Representative James Nye, the
Amendment was unnecessary because "[als citizens of the
United States [blacks] have equal right to protection, and to
keep and bear arms for self-defense."27
III. AWOL FROM HELLER: SENATOR JACOB HOWARD'S
SPEECH INTRODUCING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Heller majority conspicuously failed to mention what
is perhaps the clearest floor statement of intent to incorporate
the Second Amendment. Introducing the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Senate, Jacob Howard began: "The first
section of the amendment . . . relates to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States, and to the rights
and privileges of all persons, whether citizens or others,
under the laws of the United States."2" Explaining the actual
text's reference to "citizens of the United States," Howard
noted that the original Constitution sought to "put the
citizens of the several States on an equality with each other
as to all fundamental rights." This was done via Article IV,
which provided that "the Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 n.* (1965) (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 714 (1997) ("The right to life and to personal security is not only
sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2811 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866)) (ellipses in original).
27. Id. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1073 (1866)).
28. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). He then read the
clause, which referred to privileges or immunities of "citizens of the United
States," not of the "several States." Id. It may be that he equated those terms.
[Vol:501078
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several States."29
Howard then distinguished the Article IV "privileges and
immunities" from "the personal rights guaranteed and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution;
such as the freedom of speech and of the press; .. .the right
to keep and bear arms."30 Aside from those rights, Howard
mentioned the provisions on assembly and petition, non-
quartering of soldiers, unreasonable search and seizure, the
right of an accused person to be informed of the accusation
and to be tried by jury, excessive bail, and cruel and unusual
punishment.31  He did not mention the requirements of
indictment by grand jury or of civil jury trials where the
amount at issue is over $20-two provisions the Supreme
Court has not incorporated. 2
This "mass of privileges, immunities, and rights"-some
secured by Article IV and others by the first eight
amendments-did not restrain the States.33 Howard averred
that: "The great object of the first section of this amendment
is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel
them at all times to respect these great fundamental
guarantees."34 Of the Bill of Rights freedoms, it was clear
that "these great fundamental guarantees" included the
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Howard stated in full:
Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these
privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and
cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to
these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of
speech and of the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances, a right
appertaining to each and all the people; the right to keep and to bear
arms; the right to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a
house without the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure
except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit; the
right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial jury of
the vicinage; and also the right to be secure against excessive bail and
against cruel and unusual punishments.
Id.
32. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972) (discussing grand
jury); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (discussing civil jury).
33. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
34. Id. at 2766.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
rights he had explicitly mentioned; it is not clear, however,
that he meant by that term every procedure (such as
indictment and civil juries). It would thus be a mistake to
characterize Howard as being a proponent of total
incorporation of each and every provision of the Bill of Rights.
This point is reinforced by Howard's further reference to
"those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and
without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject
to a depotism."35 Rights related to speech and arms were
indeed prohibited by the slave codes, 3 6 and despotisms
historically prohibited commoners from arms possession.37
But societies without grand juries and civil juries have never
been considered as thereby being slave societies or
despotisms.
Howard seems to have been referring to both the
Privileges or Immunities and the Due Process Clauses when
he further remarked: "It will, if adopted by the States, forever
disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon
those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to
citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may
happen to be within their jurisdiction."38 He then referred to
the Equal Protection Clause as protecting "the same rights
and the same protections before the law" for all.39 Howard's
words were reprinted on the front page of the New York
Times and other leading newspapers.4" The Supreme Court
has repeatedly cited this speech as authority for the meaning
35. Id.
36. E.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
37. Madison referred to "the advantage of being armed, which the
Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation," and in
contrast: "Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms
of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the
governments are afraid to trust the people with arms." THE FEDERALIST No. 46
(James Madison), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME XV 492-93 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1984)
(1787-88). A popular school textbook commented: "Some tyrannical
governments resort to disarming the people, and making it an offence to keep
arms .... In all countries where despots rule with standing armies, the people
are not allowed to keep guns and other warlike weapons." JOSEPH BARTLETT
BURLEIGH, THE AMERICAN MANUAL 212 (Grigg, Elliot & Co. 1854).
38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
39. Id.
40. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 36.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.41
In the ensuing debates, no one-not even opponents of
the Amendment-questioned Howard's premise that the
Amendment made the Bill of Rights guarantees he mentioned
applicable to the states. 42 Senator Thomas A. Hendricks (D-
Ind.) objected that "the rights and immunities of citizenship"
were not "very accurately define[d]." 43  Yet such terms
seemed clear enough when he objected to the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill because it might apply in his state: "We do not
allow to colored people there [sic] many civil rights and
immunities which are enjoyed by the white people."4 As he
well knew, one such right was the right of the people "to bear
arms for the defense of themselves and the State."45
Similarly, Senator Reverdy Johnson (D-Md.) objected to
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, noting that, "I do not
understand what will be the effect of that."46 He made no
such comment about the Due Process Clause. Moreover, at
that point, Senator Howard had proposed what became the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,47 which
was designed to overrule the Dred Scott decision.4  As
counsel for the slave owner in Dred Scott, Johnson was well
aware of the Court's holding that "the people" and "the
citizens" were synonymous terms that excluded African-
Americans. 49 If they were citizens, African-Americans would
be exempt from the special "police regulations" applicable to
them: "It would give to persons of the negro race ... the full
liberty of speech . . .; to hold public meetings upon political
affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went."5'
41. See infra notes 65 and 66 and accompanying text.
42. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.8 (1966) (noting that
Howard's explanation of the Enforcement Clause "was not questioned by anyone
in the course of the debate").
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3039 (1866).
44. Id. at 318 (1866).
45. IND. CONST. art. I, § 32. Hendricks had participated in debate over this
very provision at the constitutional convention that approved the Indiana
Constitution. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION 574 (Austin H. Brown ed. 1851). See also State v.
Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (1832) (holding that the right protected the open
carrying of firearms).
46. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866).
47. Id. at 2890 (1866).
48. Id. at 3031 (1866) (explanation by Sen. John B. Henderson).
49. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857).
50. Id. at 417.
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While the Heller Court did not mention Senator Howard's
contributions to the debate, it is likely that the Court will do
so when it decides in McDonald v. City of Chicago whether
the Second Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth.
51 A careful reading of Howard's speech does not necessarily
support an understanding that the entire Bill of Rights would
be incorporated or that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
makes substantive Bill of Rights guarantees applicable to the
States. He referred to "great fundamental guarantees" and
mentioned selective Bill of Rights freedoms, not including
some of the procedural provisions that do not necessarily
guarantee fundamental rights. He discussed "rights," not just
"privileges and immunities" guaranteed to "the people"; not
just "citizens," which suggests incorporation under the Due
Process Clause; and not the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The clause "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law" embodies the
premise that life, liberty, and property are "rights," and that
the people, not just citizens, hold them.52 There is thus a
textual basis for incorporation under the Due Process Clause,
because a "right of the people" may be said to be not
synonymous with a "privilege or immunity of the citizen."
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
The Heller majority made note of discussion surrounding
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1,53 quoting from
Representative Benjamin Butler's explanation of his
expansive version of the draft bill:
Section eight is intended to enforce the well-known
constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of the
citizen to "keep and bear arms," and provides that
whoever shall take away, by force or violence, or by
51. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted sub nom., McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
52. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."); NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERIcAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, VOL. II 59 (S. Converse
1828) ("RIGHT ... All men have a right to the secure enjoyment of life, personal
safety, liberty and property.").
53. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006)).
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threats and intimidation, the arms and weapons which
any person may have for his defense, shall be deemed
guilty of larceny of the same. 
54
This statement reflects a belief that the Second Amendment
recognizes an individual right, but the Fourteenth
Amendment only prohibits deprivation of rights by the States
and not by private persons, and thus this provision was
stripped out of the civil rights bill.
Had incorporation been the issue, the Heller Court would
have found the words of Representative John Bingham-
author of the Fourteenth Amendment-pertinent. The
Supreme Court quoted Bingham as intending to nullify
Barron v. Baltimore (1833)," 5 which held the Bill of Rights
inapplicable to the states.56 In the same speech that the
Court quoted, Bingham characterized "the right of the people
to keep and bear arms" as one of the "limitations upon the
power of the States made so by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 57
In Patsy v. Board of Regents, the Court quoted
Representative Henry L. Dawes on the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of "these rights, privileges, and
immunities,"58 which Dawes more specifically identified as
follows:
He has secured to him the right to keep and bear arms in
his defense .... It is all these, Mr. Speaker, which are
comprehended in the words, "American citizen," and it is
to protect and to secure him in these rights, privileges and
immunities this bill is before the House.59
Patsy also cited Representative Washington Whitthorne as an
opponent who recognized the bill's broad purposes. On the
page of the Globe cited by the Court, Whitthorne stated that
54. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810-11 (2008) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 41-37, at 7-8 (1871)).
55. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
56. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 686-87 (1978).
57. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871).
58. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982). Patsy further relied
on the speeches of Rep. Butler, Rep. John Coburn, and Senator Allen Thurman.
Id. at 504-06. In related statements each of them regarded the right to arms to
be among the "rights, immunities, and privileges" guaranteed in the
Constitution. H.R. Rep. No. 41-37, at 3 (3d Sess. 1871) (Rep. Butler); CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871) (Rep. Coburn); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
2d Sess. 25-26 (1872) (Sen. Thurman).
59. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 475-76 (1871).
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under the civil rights bill, if a police officer seized a pistol
from a "drunken negro"-a racist slur intended to prevent
blacks from vindicating their rights-then "the officer may be
sued, because the right to bear arms is secured by the
Constitution."60 This observation thus anticipated actions
against police for violation of the right to bear arms under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified today as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.61
The Heller majority concluded that it "was plainly the
understanding in the post-Civil War Congress that the
Second Amendment protected an individual right to use armsfor self-defense." 62  While the Court only scratched the
surface, almost countless further sources support this
conclusion.
V. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT: WAS THE CONCERN THAT
BLACKS WERE DISARMED ONLY BY REASON OF MILITIA
MEMBERSHIP?
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens conceded that
some of the legislative history of the post-Civil War period
supports the understanding of the Second Amendment as
securing a right to firearm ownership "for purely private
purposes like personal self-defense."63 He mentioned,
however, that the legislative statements were made long after
the Amendment's framing and thus shed no "insight into the
intent of the Framers";64 query what he will say about the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers when the Court considers
whether that Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Second. Stevens further averred that the statements "were
made during pitched political debates, so that they are better
characterized as advocacy than good-faith attempts at
constitutional interpretation."6
But in other cases, the Court-including Justice
Stevens-has routinely relied on the same debates to explain
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Howard's
60. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 n.6; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 337
(1871).
61. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006)).
62. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2811 (2008).
63. Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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speech introducing the Amendment is a prime example.
Writing for the Court in Jones v. Helms, Justice Stevens
favorably quoted from the same page of the Globe where
Howard stated that the personal right to keep and bear arms
would be protected from State action.66 Other precedents also
rely on Howard's speech. 67
Justice Stevens took issue with the majority's suggestion
that the disarming of the freedmen was perceived as
infringing on their constitutional right to keep and bear arms.
Justice Scalia said "the claim was not that blacks were being
prohibited from carrying arms in an organized state
militia,"68 but Stevens responded that "some of the claims of
the sort the Court cites may have been just that."69 Stevens
further explained that Republican governments in the South
created what came to be known as "negro militias," the
arming of which led to resistance and Klan terror,70 where
"[1]eading members of the Negro militia were beaten or
lynched and their weapons stolen."71 The statement's source,
however, was dated 1872, and as the following explains, such
events took place in a later period of Reconstruction than the
debates of 1866, which Justice Scalia quoted.72
When the war ended in 1865, the southern states passed
the Black Codes, which disarmed African-Americans and
were enforced by local authorities and state militias.73 This
was viewed as a violation of the rights of individual freedmen
to keep and bear arms.74 Justice Stevens does not mention
the Black Codes at all. Yet it could hardly be argued that
66. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 424 n.23 (1981) (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)). Justice Stevens also joined the majority in
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1982) (stating that Howard was "explicit
about the broad objectives of the Amendment").
67. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 600 (1964) (quoting Howard on
"those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society"); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.8 (1966) (stating that Howard's explanation of the
Enforcement Clause "was not questioned by anyone in the course of the
debate").
68. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2810.
69. Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA 176-177
(Oxford University Press 2006)).
72. CORNELL, supra note 72, at 177, 254 n.16-17 (citing generally H.R. REP.
NO. 42-22 (1872). See also HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 137.
73. See, e.g., HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 1-5.
74. Id. at 6-11.
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those who favored rights for the freedmen objected only to the
application of such laws to the extent they disarmed blacks by
reason of militia membership, and did not object to the
disarming of blacks who kept firearms for self defense,
hunting, or shooting crows.
In 1866, Congress responded by enacting the Civil Rights
and Freedmen's Bureau Acts and proposing the Fourteenth
Amendment. In 1867, when Senator Wilson could still say
that the militia organizations "go up and down the country
taking arms away from men who own arms, and committing
outrages of various kinds," 75 he succeeded in having his bill
passed to "disband" the southern state militias. Yet he did so
only after removing the term "disarm" from the text, based on
Senator Waitman Willey's objection against "disarming the
whole people of the South."76
It was only after Republicans gained control over the
Southern governments that the State power to maintain
militias was restored in 1869-70. 77 This led to the creation of
the "Negro militias," which were confronted by armed white
groups.18 Justice Stevens is incorrect in suggesting that the
complaints about disarming the freedmen in 1866 actually
concerned the disarming of black militias that were organized
three or four years later.
VI. WAS MILITIA MEMBERSHIP THE BASIS OF PROSECUTIONS
UNDER THE ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1870?
Justice Stevens' opinion recounts the 1871 murder of
black militia captain Jim Williams by Klansmen in South
Carolina.79 It concludes that "[iun light of this evidence, it is
quite possible that at least some of the statements on which
the Court relies actually did mean to refer to the
disarmament of black militia members."8 °
75. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1849 (1867).
76. Id.; 14 Stat. 487 (1867); see HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 68-
69.
77. 15 Stat. 266, 337 (1869); see HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at
113-15.
78. OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION 8-15
(University of Texas Press 1957).
79. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2842 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Louis F. Post, A "Carpetbagger" in South Carolina, 10 J.
NEGRO HIST. 10 (1925)).
80. Id.
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Actually, both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens are
correct in a sense. The white supremacists-whether acting
as state governments or, later, as private armed
organizations such as the Klan-sought to disarm all African-
Americans,"' especially those suspected of voting the Radical
Republican ticket.8 2 It did not matter whether the freedman
kept a pistol in his cabin for self-defense, was out hunting
with a shotgun, or had a musket for use in a militia; 3
confiscation of firearms in any of those scenarios was
perceived as a violation of Second Amendment rights."
What Justice Stevens considers "quite possible" simply
did not occur. On the night they killed Williams, Klansmen
raided the houses of numerous blacks, seized their firearms,
and sought to intimidate them into not voting Republican."
Indictments brought in United States v. Avery and other cases
alleged violation of the rights of citizens to keep and bear
arms and to vote.8 6 It was never suggested that Williams and
the other victims had Second Amendment rights only because
81. For instance, a House of Representatives Report explained about a
predecessor bill which would be partly enacted as the Civil Rights Act of 1871:
Section eight is intended to enforce the well-known constitutional
provision guaranteeing the right in the citizen to "keep and bear arms,"
and provides that whoever shall take away, by force or violence, or by
threats and intimidation, the arms and weapons which any person may
have for his defense, shall be deemed guilty of larceny of the same....
Before these midnight marauders made attacks upon peaceful citizens,
there were very many instances in the South where the sheriff of the
county had preceded them and taken away the arms of their victims.
This was specially noticeable in Union County [South Carolina], where
all the negro population were disarmed by the sheriff only a few
months ago under the order of the judge who resigned lest he should be
impeached by the legislature; and then, the sheriff having disarmed the
citizens, the five hundred masked men rode at night and murdered and
otherwise maltreated the ten persons who were in jail in that county.
H.R. REP. No 41-37, at 7-8 (1871).
82. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS IN THE Ku KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN
THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT 233-34, 242 (Republican Printing Co. 1872)
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS IN THE Ku KLUX TRIALS].
83. See, e.g., Mississippi, The Attitude of the State and the Explanation-
The Civil Rights Bill Declared Unconstitutional by a State Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1866, at 2, col. 3 (reporting a conviction of an African-American who
was engaged in hunting, for possessing a firearm).
84. See generally HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, chs. 1, 2, 5, & 6.
85. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS IN THE KU KLUX TRIALS, supra note 83, at 206,
222-23,233-37, & 242.
86. United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 251 (1872); PROCEEDINGS IN
THE KU KLUX TRIALS, supra note 83, at 142-43.
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they were militiamen. The court did not allow the Second
Amendment counts to go to trial because no state action was
involved. s
During this period, the United States brought
indictments against private parties alleging violations of
First, Second, and Fourth Amendment rights under the 1870
Enforcement Act.88 The indictments typically involved Klan
attacks on freedmen who exercised their rights to assemble
and to keep and bear arms, and who were subjected to
unlawful searches and seizures.8 9
In one such case, Circuit Judge William Woods found Bill
of Rights guarantees to be "secured" by the Constitution
because: "They are expressly recognized, and both congress
and the states are forbidden to abridge them. Before the
fourteenth amendment, congress could not impair them, but
the states might. Since the fourteenth amendment, . . .the
states are positively inhibited from impairing or abridging
them ...."90
In a trial involving alleged violation of free speech and
assembly, where both antagonists were bearing arms and a
riot ensured, Judge Woods charged the jury:
[Ilt is the right of an American citizen, whether he be
black or white, to bear arms, provided he does so for his
defense or for no unlawful purpose, and in a manner not
forbidden by law .... But if a man carries his weapon in
full view, whether gun or pistol, and does so with unlawful
[sic] purpose, his right to do so is as clear as his right to
carry a watch or wear a chain. 91
These trials were soon nipped in the bud by a Supreme
Court decision that, as no State action was involved, rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were inapplicable.
87. See HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 141-45 (describing the
prosecutions for the Williams murder and related Klan attacks).
88. 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (protecting rights "granted or secured" by the
Constitution).
89. See HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, chs. 6-7.
90. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No.
15,202). When later appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Woods authored
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
91. Important Trial, The Enforcement Act, Charge of Judge Woods,
LOUISIANIAN, Mar. 28, 1872 (stating jury instructions for the 1872 case United
States v. Jolly).
1088 [Vol:50
PROTECTING ALL FREEDMEN?
VII. THE CRUIKSHANK PROSECUTION: "BEARING ARMS FOR A
LAWFUL PURPOSE"
The indictment in United States v. Cruikshank alleged a
conspiracy under the Enforcement Act and identified the
victims as Levi Nelson and Alexander Tillman, two freedmen
who were disarmed and shot.9 2 Nelson survived but Tillman
did not. The first two counts were as follows:
The first count was for banding together, with intent
"unlawfully and feloniously to injure, oppress, threaten,
and intimidate" two citizens of the United States, "of
African descent and persons of color," "with the unlawful
and felonious intent thereby" them "to hinder and prevent
in their respective free exercise and enjoyment of their
lawful right and privilege to peaceably assemble together
with each other and with other citizens of the said United
States for a peaceable and lawful purpose."
The second avers an intent to hinder and prevent the
exercise by the same persons of the "right to keep and bear
arms for a lawful purpose. "
93
Judge Woods, together with a second judge, tried the
Cruikshank case. Similar to the case above, he issued the
following charge to the jury:
The right to bear arms is also a right secured by the
constitution and laws of the United States. Every citizen
of the United States has the right to bear arms, provided
it is done for a lawful purpose and in a lawful manner. A
man who carries his arms openly, and for his own
protection, or for any other lawful purpose, has as clear a
right to do so as to carry his own watch or wear his own
hat.9
4
The jury could not reach a verdict, 95 and a retrial was
presided over by Judge Woods and by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice J.S. Bradley. 96 The defendants were convicted, but
Justice Bradley granted a motion to arrest judgment in part
92. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544-45, 548 (1876).
93. Id. at 544-45.
94. The Grant Parish Prisoners, NEW ORLEANS REPUBLICAN, Mar. 14, 1874,
at 1. An almost identical instruction was given when the case was retried. THE
DAILY PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 9, 1874, at 2.
95. The Grant Parish Prisoners, NEW ORLEANS REPUBLICAN, Mar. 14,
1874, at 1.
96. The Grant Parish Case, THE DAILY PICAYUNE, May 19, 1874, at 1, 4.
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because, as he said from the bench: "The United States courts
have no jurisdiction over a violation by an individual of the
right of another to bear arms." 9 ' In a formal opinion, he
explained why the First and Second Amendment counts were
defective:
The 14th amendment declares that no state shall by law
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States. Grant that this prohibition now prevents
the states from interfering with the right to assemble, as
being one of such privileges and immunities, still, does it
give congress power to legislate over the subject?... If the
amendment is not violated, it has no power over the
subject.
The second count, which is for conspiracy to interfere with
certain citizens in their right to bear arms, is open to the
same criticism as the first....
... In none of these counts is there any averment that the
state had, by its laws interfered with any of the rights
referred to .... 98
Judge Woods disagreed, and their certificate of division
sent the case to the Supreme Court.99 The Brief for the
United States contained no argument on the First and Second
Amendments, only one superficial reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment, and no discussion of the state-action
requirement. 100
In Cruikshank the Court opined that the First and
Second Amendments only applied to the federal government,
but no state action was involved in the case and incorporation
was not mentioned. 101 The Court stated that both rights pre-
dated the Constitution: "The right of the people peaceably to
assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States. . . . It was not,
97. The Grant Parish Case, NEW ORLEANS REPUBLICAN, June 28, 1874, at 1.
98. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 714-15 (C.C.D. La. 1874).
99. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 546 (1876).
100. Brief for the United States at 2, 6, Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. This
default was somewhat similar to, but not quite as egregious as, United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), in which, "[the respondent made no appearance in
the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard
from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make
that case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the Second
Amendment)." District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2814 (2008).
101. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.
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therefore, a right granted to the people by the
Constitution." 12 Similarly, the Court noted of the right of
"bearing arms for a lawful purpose": "This is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner
dependent upon that instrument for its existence." It left "the
people to look for their protection against any violation by
their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes" to the
States.' 3 No violation by the States or localities was involved
in the case.
The Heller majority made two references to Cruikshank.
First, it repeated the above quotation about the right not
being "granted" by the Constitution to support the claim that
"[tihe very text of the Second Amendment implicitly
recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only
that it 'shall not be infringed.' "104 It then wrote, contrary to
Justice Stevens' assertion, that "there was no pre-existing
right in English law 'to use weapons for certain military
purposes' or to use arms in an organized militia."0 5
Second, Heller discusses Cruikshank as (among other
precedents) not foreclosing its conclusions about the Second
Amendment's meaning. The Heller Court wrote that
Cruikshank vacated "the convictions of members of a white
mob for depriving blacks of their right to keep and bear
arms," and "held that the Second Amendment does not by its
own force apply to anyone other than the Federal
Government."10 6 This is not entirely accurate; the only issue
in Cruikshank that was pertinent in Heller was whether
private actors-the only ones involved in the case-could
violate the Amendment. What a court says about matters not
before it is dictum. To be sure, the dictum was weighty: "The
second amendment ... means no more than that it shall not
be infringed by Congress."107
The Heller majority continued: "States, we said, were free
to restrict or protect the right under their police powers."'
Actually, Cruikshank said nothing about States restricting
102. Id. at 551-52.
103. Id. at 553.
104. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
105. Id. at 2798 n.16.
106. Id. at 2812.
107. Id. at 2813 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).
108. Id.
20101 1091
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the right, it only said-as Heller acknowledges-that "'the
people [must] look for their protection against any violation
by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes' to the
States' police power." °9 In other words, people who stole or
seized firearms would be prosecuted by local authorities for
larceny. At any rate, the Heller majority remarked, "[t]hat
discussion makes little sense if it is only a right to bear arms
in a state militia."110
The Heller Court went on to write that Cruikshank,
supports "the individual-rights interpretation.""' There was
no claim in Cruikshank that the victims had been deprived of
their right to carry arms in a militia; indeed, the Governor
had disbanded the local militia unit the year before the mob's
attack .... , Additionally, while not mentioned in Heller,
the various indictments against white supremacists for
violating the right of freedmen to possess arms did not
mention the "militia," and this term does not appear
anywhere in Cruikshank.
Justice Stevens disputed this notion. He said "it is
entirely possible" that the basis for the Second Amendment
counts in the Cruikshank indictment:
[Wlas the prosecutor's belief that the victims-members of
a group of citizens, mostly black but also white, who were
rounded up by the Sheriff, sworn in as a posse to defend
the local courthouse, and attacked by a white mob-bore
sufficient resemblance to members of a state militia that
they were brought within the reach of the Second
Amendment. 113
Yet the prosecutor, U.S. Attorney G.R. Beckwith, never
expressed any such belief. He indicted the defendants for
conspiracy to prevent two freedmen from exercising the "right
to keep and bear arms for a lawful purpose," "' not
specifically for a militia purpose. Indeed, nothing in the case
suggests any such theory, which is absent from the testimony,
109. Id. (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).
110. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 (2008).
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED 62 (Henry Holt &
Co. 2008)). See also LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE (Oxford
University Press 2008) (describing the incident).
113. Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing generally LANE, supra note
113).
114. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 544-45.
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arguments of counsel, jury instructions, or rulings by the trial
court and the Supreme Court. 115
Justice Stevens went on to denounce what the prosecutor
had in mind, based on what was expressed in the indictment.
Cruikshank "explained that the defective indictment
contained such language ['bearing arms for a lawful purpose'],
but the Court did not itself describe the right, or endorse the
indictment's description of the right."116 In response, Justice
Scalia wrote: "But, in explicit reference to the right described
in the indictment, the Court stated that '[t]he second
amendment declares that it [i.e., the right of bearing arms for
a lawful purpose] shall not be infringed.' "117
Justice Stevens concluded his discussion with a reference
to "Cruikshank's holding that the Second Amendment posed
no obstacle to regulation by state governments."' Aside
from the fact that Cruikshank did not involve regulation by a
state government, that may be wishful thinking based on the
majority's final word on the subject: "With respect to
Cruikshank's continuing validity on incorporation, a question
not presented by this case, we note that Cruikshank also said
that the First Amendment did not apply against the States
and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment
inquiry required by our later cases."119
115. See HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, supra note 1, at 159-82.
116. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (brackets in original).
117. Id. at 2813 n.22 (brackets in original) (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at
553).
118. Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2813 n.23. The Court added, "[olur later decisions in Presser v.
Illinois and Miller v. Texas, reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies
only to the Federal Government." Id. (citations omitted). Presser held that a
state ban on armed parades in cities did not violate the Second Amendment, but
made no mention of the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment. Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1886). Miller held that the Second and Fourth
Amendments did not apply directly to the states, and refused to consider
whether they so applied through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the issue had not been raised at trial. Miller v.
Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 537-39 (1894). For an analysis of these cases, see
generally, Stephen P. Halbrook, The Rights of Workers to Assemble and to Bear
Arms: Presser v. Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the
Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 943 (1999); Cynthia
Leonardatos, David B. Kopel, & Stephen P. Halbrook, Miller versus Texas:
Police Violence Race Relations, Capital Punishment, and Gun-toting, 9 J. L. &
POL'Y 737 (2001).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The stage is set for the Court to resolve in 2010 whether
the Second Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, either through its Due Process Clause or
Privileges or Immunities Clause, so as to protect from State
infringement the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
The common understanding during Reconstruction was that
the Fourteenth Amendment did protect the right from
violation by the States.
